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birth rate and give less education to their children than people working in the modern 
sector using human capital as the sole input. Rural-urban migration thus changes parents' 
decisions on fertility and children's education: urbanization and demographic transition are 
two sides of the same coin. The model is also consistent with growth empirics finding no 
statistically significant relationship between education and growth while at the micro-level 
individual incomes are significantly affected by education. A closed economy never faces 
the resource curse. The autarkic growth rate is a weighted average of human capital 
growth rates in rural and urban areas with the weight equalling the share of rural goods in 
final demand. A resource abundant country opening to international trade may face 
resource curse if it completely specializes in the production of the resource intensive good. 
Its terms of trade can decline over an extended period if its population growth rate is high. 
This mechanism of terms of trade deterioration focuses solely on demographic factors and 
differs from the original Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. The result also shows the potential 
importance of birth control in development. 
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11. Introduction
One of the best documented facts on economic growth is that globally growth rates
have diverged at least since the early 1800’s (Lucas 2002, Pritchett 1997). There are
several explanations for this phenomenon starting from colonialism (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson 2001, 2003). Recently an attempt has been made to connect the divergence
to demographic transition. By demographic transition (see Lee, 2003) I mean the process
in which the onset of growth (and industrialization) is first accompanied by an increase
in population growth rates1 and later by a decline in birth rates with per capita incomes
growing all the time. The connection between growth and fertility is built through the
decisions within families. Families face the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ in deciding how
many children to have. Parents can invest in children’s education at the cost of having
fewer children. The choice depends on what incentives the economic environment provides
for the human capital accumulation. With good incentives children get education which
feeds to growth. Higher growth in turn improves incentives further. Typical models (e.g.
Lucas 2002, ch. 5, Galor and Weil 2000) study the factors that allow economies to escape
the Malthusian steady state where increases in income lead to population expansion and
return to low per capita incomes.
Aside from demographic transition other reasons for the divergence of global incomes
have also been proposed. One such on which this paper focuses is the resource curse:
countries with abundant natural resources have on average grown slowly compared to
resource poor economies. The evidence is produced e.g. in Auty (2001), Gylfason (1999,
2001) and Perälä (2004). Currently the curse is most often associated with the political
economy of resource abundance: the contest for resource rents can lead to civil wars
and create corruption. Resource abundance thus leads to ineﬃcient allocation of talent
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991). A more classic explanation is the Prebisch-Singer
thesis which claims that the relative prices of resource abundant goods will fall over time
implying that terms of trade of resource rich countries will decline.
In this paper, I focus on the role of international trade in creating resource curse. The
feature separating the model built from the rest of the literature is that educational and
fertility decisions are diﬀerentiated on the basis of parents’ location: in rural areas where
people are working in agriculture, decisions diﬀer from those made in urban areas, where
people work in the modern sector (some empirical evidence is presented in the next sec-
tion).2 Trade will, at least initially, improve the terms of trade of resource abundant
economies. This shifts resources away from the human capital intensive production, and
reduces incentives to accumulate human capital: people will move back to rural areas,
1In most cases due to the decline in mortality.
2Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) focus on the fertility diﬀerential between educated and uneducated
parents and the connection between urbanization and demographic transition in a two-sector model.
Yet, their model does not have any rural-urban migration. To model the transfer of resources between
the sectors they assume that demand for agricultural products is income inelastic, an assumption not
needed here. Finally, they do not have natural resources as an input to rural production and produce
solely numerical results. de la Croix and Doepke (2003) have argued for the importance of diﬀerential
fertility rates in explaining growth performance. The diﬀerential explored in this paper is based on
parents’ occupation but it also implies that relatively wealthier (in terms of human capital) parents have
smaller number of children and give more education exactly as in de la Croix and Doepke.
2where they want to have more children and provide less education. Hence, trade delays
demographic transition and increases international growth diﬀerentials. If the increase in
the birth rate is large enough, the terms of trade of the resource abundant country can
decline over extended periods after improving initially. Moreover, the decline does not
go on forever. This formalizes the possibility to terms-of-trade deterioration for countries
specializing in production to resource intensive goods emphasized by Prebisch (1950) and
Singer (1950). Yet, the mechanism producing the result in this paper does not have any-
thing to do with the explanation provided by Prebisch and Singer as they emphasized the
low income elasticity of demand for these goods. Here the focus is solely on demographic
factors (which depend interestingly on the share of agricultural products in final demand).
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has raised heated debate, but currently there seems to
be quite robust evidence that the terms of trade of countries exporting primary commodi-
ties have declined over a long period (Bunzel and Vogelsang 2003). In addition, there is
also evidence that liberalizing trade has led to a terms of trade deterioration in some coun-
tries exporting primary commodities (Gilbert and Varangis 2004, McMillan and Rodrik
2002).
The model I develop is consistent with the stylized facts of demographic transition
with both diﬀerential ferility and rural-urban migration being the building blocks of the
explanation. It provides one explanation to the empirical growth research puzzle: in
macro studies, it is hard to find any connection between education and growth, while in
micro studies, there is a strong link between individual’s education and incomes. Here the
relationship between education and growth is convex while wages are strictly increasing
in human capital and thus education.
Along with Galor and Weil (2000), Hazan and Berdugo (2002), Iyugin (2000), Kalemli-
Oczan (2003) and Kögel and Prskawetz (2001) I use an overlapping-generations frame-
work. In contrast to most of these models (Kögel and Prskawetz 2001 is an exception), I
use a two-sector framework with intersectoral migration.3 I am essentially putting demo-
graphic issues into the traditional Lewis-Fei-Ranis model of development augmented with
rural-urban-migration. The migration model resembles closely the classic Harris-Todaro
model in the sense that the urban wage is fixed each period by technology and past hu-
man accumulation decisions. There is no urban unemployment, however, as all prices are
flexible.
Lucas (2004) builds an infinite horizon model of rural-urban migration.4 His main
point is to model a continuous process of migration, not just one shot jump, of people
from rural areas (where there is no technological progress in production methods) to cities
where production uses human capital. Continuous migration follows from assuming that
3In Hazan and Berdugo (2002) there are firms using either of two technologies to produce the same good.
Workers can choose the type of firm they want to be employed in. Lucas (2001) ch. 5 contains a model
where each representative family has access to two technologies to produce the same good. Neither one
of these papers contains an analysis of rural-urban migration. In Kögel and Prskawetz (2001) (which
basically adds fertility decision in Matsuyama 1992) there is no education and the driving force of growth
is the exogenous change in agricultural productivity. Modern sector growth is driven by increasing returns
due to specialization in the form of increasing varieties of intermediate products. Finally, labor movement
between sectors do not have any implications for development as such in Kögel-Prskawetz while here they
are crucial.
4I came across this paper after writing the first draft of my paper.
3in cities there are externalities in human capital formation (there is no human capital
formation in rural areas contrary to evidence in e.g. Kochar 2004) with the late migrants
benefiting as an externality from the human capital formation of early migrants. Lucas’
model is an one-sector model with two technologies but here rural and urban goods
are diﬀerent and their relative price matters for the migration decisions. This makes
it harder to get a continuous flow of migrants from rural areas as the relative price of
rural goods tends to increase due to migration. The key are the fertility and human
capital accumulation decisions in rural and urban areas: rural fertility is higher than
urban providing the pool of migrants. There is thus no need to assume externalities in
human capital accumulation. Finally, one of the main points here is to tie rural-urban
migration to demographic transition and to the role of international trade in economic
growth. Both of these issues are beyond the focus of Lucas’s model.
Recently, Galor and Mountford (2003) have, also in an OLG framework, noted the
potential role of international trade in explaining the global divergence5. Their model
is based on a Ricardian model of trade while the model here is of Heckscher-Ohlin (or
Ricardo-Viner) variety. Galor and Mountford assume that countries initially diﬀer across
sectors in productivity when old technologies are used. Then they show that the more
productive economy has an incentive to adopt new technologies, when they become avail-
able. International trade accelerates the transition of the more productive economy to
sustained growth, while the process is delayed in the more backward economy. My model
does not rely on any inherent technological diﬀerences in explaining the growth diﬀer-
ences but ties them to diﬀerences in endogenously determined relative factor endowments
in economies with explicit internal migration. Hence, I can e.g. focus on the crucial role
of timing the opening of the country to international trade. My model ties the resource
curse to the deterioration of terms of trade of the resource abundant economy, whereas
in Galor and Mountford, the terms of trade deterioration is not possible. Also here, the
rural-urban migration is crucial for development as it has been in the history, while in
Galor and . In Galor and Mounford parents’ fertility and educational decisions do not
depend on the place of residence.
Another related study is Matsuyama (1992). In a two-sector infinite horizon model, he
argues that an exogenous increase in agricultural productivity increases growth in a closed
economy if the demand for agricultural products is income inelastic (as in Prebisch-Singer
argument): improvements in agricultural productivity will then shift labor to manufac-
turing, where productivity growth is assumed to be of learning-by-doing variety. In an
open economy, countries with high agricultural productivity specialize in agriculture, and
thus their manufacturing sector declines reducing overall growth. In this paper, a simi-
lar type of mechanism is working: relatively resource abundant countries shift resources
away from the modern sector when trade is opened. Yet, it does not mean that their
welfare is reduced, as their terms of trade will improve, if they remain incompletely spe-
cialized. Matsuyama ignores the terms of trade eﬀects. In this paper, labor movements
are associated with changes in endogenous fertility and educational decisions which af-
fect growth. Interestingly enough, endogenously determined fertility, on which opening of
5There is a heated debate on the role of economic openness in economic growth. Recent studies seem
to show that the role of openness is small or insignificant once institutional quality is controlled for in
estimations (Bosworth and Collins 2003).
4trade has an eﬀect, can have eﬀects similar to improvements in agricultural productivity.
In this respect, the present paper can be seen as endogenizing something that is exoge-
nous in Matsuyama. Finally, our results do not depend on the assumption of inelastic
demand for agricultural products but they would only be strenghtened were one to use
that assumption.
2. The Model and the Closed Economy Equilibrium
People live in an overlapping generations economy for two periods. In the first period
they are educated by their parents. There is by now much evidence that parent’s have
a strong influence on children’s human capital (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2003 and
Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2003). In the second period, they work, make fertility
decisions, and educate their children. People can work either in rural area in their farm,
or in the modern sector of the urban area. In the rural sector production requires unskilled
labor and resource to be called land. At the beginning of their working career (beginning
of the second period of their life), people decide where to work. After that decision, they
make the fertility and educational decisions. I first study the closed economy equilibrium
Consider first the decisions made in a representative farm household. Along with most
of the literature6, I assume that families have Cobb-Douglas preferences over their personal
welfare derived from current consumption and over the incomes of their children. There
is a trade-oﬀ between these two components of welfare, as raising and educating children
takes parents’ time, which reduces the time available for working thus reducing their
consumption. The driving force of the model are the trade-oﬀs rural and urban parents
face. Parameter γ measures the degree of parents’ selfishness, i.e. the weight they put
to their own consumption. Since there are two goods produced in the economy, I also
assume that the preferences over these goods are given by a Cobb-Douglas function with
β = share of rural goods in total consumption. Preferences over goods are assumed to be
independent of the residence, i.e. urban dwellers allocate their expenditure over goods in
same proportions as residents in the rural area. The Cobb-Douglas specification implies
that both goods will also be consumed and, hence, in the closed economy, produced in the
country. Rural production requires labor and land as inputs. Rural production technology
is also Cobb-Douglas with parameter α = weight of labor in input index. When parents
know that all of their children have the possibility to work in the modern sector, and some
of them will do it, the indirect utility function of a family living in the countryside at the
beginning of their career in period t after deciding where to work is7
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where pr = price of the rural good, call it rye, nrt = number of members of the rural
family working in the farm, nrt+1 = number of children each of the n
r
t members of this
6Galor and Weil (2000) is a representative example. The alternative would be to assume that current
family is concerned with the welfare of the families of their children. This is e.g. the route taken by
Lucas (2002), ch. 5.
7Recently, Kochar 2004 has shown that in India the prospect of employment in urban areas and urban
rates of return on human capital have an impact on educational decisions made in rural areas.
5family will have, τ r0 = time required in the rural area to raise one children regardless
of the education given, τ r1 = time required in the rural area per unit of education, e
r
t+1
= education given to each child, R = land at the disposal of the family, β = share of
rural goods in expenditure, and η = wage the children can earn in the urban sector per
unit of human capital they have, determined by the modern sector production technology
(see below). Each person is assumed to have 1 unit of time available that can be used
either to work or to raise children including children’s education. The crucial assumption
underlying (1) is that current parents know that their children can work in either sector
and mobility is perfect. Hence, children’s income is given by the income they can earn
in the urban sector. This income is directly proportional to the children’s human capital.
Also it is assumed that each adult has 1 unit of time which can be used to work or raise
and educate children. In the farm, the total amount of time is thus nrt and I assume that
each adult participates in raising the children. This is thus a model of an extended family,
a family consisting of nrt members, each of whom has own children. The currently working
urban generation maximizes urt by choosing n
r
t+1 and e
r
t+1. In choosing the education the
family understands that it aﬀects the future human capital of the children:
hrt+1 = h
¡
ert+1, h
p
t
¢
, he, hh > 0 (2)
where hpt = parents’ human capital. This makes the human capital of a child dependent
on the mobility history of her parents in addition to current location of her parents. I
assume away all externalities, though it would be rather easy to include them8. The first
order conditions of the optimum are, after some straightforward manipulation9 (first for
nrt+1, then for e
r
t+1):
[γα+ (1− γ)]
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and
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An interesting implication of (3) is that the total time rural household allocates to chil-
dren’s education is given by¡
τ r0 + τ
r
1e
r
t+1
¢
nrt+1 =
1− γ
γα+ (1− γ)(< 1) (5)
In addition to showing that there is a quality-quantity trade-oﬀ in making the fertility
decision, it also shows that rural production technology has an impact on it. The stronger
8One could e.g. include spill overs so that people who move to cities will improve their human capital
to the urban level right after moving or that their children will learn from other urban families. Lucas
(2004) follows this track. Not much would change after these changes. The only significant change would
be that urban income inequality would be reduced from what the model now implies.
9Assuming that rural technology is Cobb-Douglas (in addition to the other assumptions) the resource
endowment of the family does not have any eﬀect on household decisions on fertility and education. With
e.g. a general CES technology the impact would be ambiguous. de la Croix and Doepke (2003) build a
model where wealth eﬀect matter for the fertility and educational choices. Here the point is to derive a
model where rural and urban people make diﬀerent choices. As becomes apparent, one need not introduce
wealth eﬀects to model the diﬀerence.
6the diminishing returns in labor are (the smaller α is), the larger is the time allocated
to getting and raising children. This is intuitive: the less productive labor is in rye
production the more productive it is (relatively speaking) in producing new children.
Consider next the urban household. Its (indirect) utility is, analogously to (1), given
by
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This is a utility function of a small, one member, family, not of an extended family like in
the countryside. The technology available for raising and educating children is allowed to
diﬀer between rural and urban areas. The degree of altruism towards the next generation
is assumed to be the same everywhere in the society. Also the technology of human capital
accumulation is the same everywhere10
hut+1 = h(e
u
t+1, h
p
t ), he, hh > 0 (7)
The optimal choices are characterized by the following equations:¡
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Comparing (5) with (8) directly yields the first result: Rural households spend more total
time on children than urban households do. In particular, if the educational decisions are
identical then rural households are more fertile than urban households.
To get ahead with the educational decisions I assume that (2) and (7) have the following
specification:
h
j
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h
p
t , 0 < θ < 1, j = r, u (10)
giving from (4) and (9)
e
j
t+1 =
θτ
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j
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(1− θ) τ j1
≡ ej, θτ j0 − τ
j
1 > 0 (11)
= 0, θτ j0 − τ
j
1 ≤ 0
The parameters must fulfill θτ j0 − τ
j
1 > 0 to have positive investment in education. I
assume that the time cost of education is the same in both areas (τ r1 = τ
u
1). The time
cost of raising children in the urban area is larger than in the rural area, τu0 > τ
r
0. The
idea here is that the children in rural areas can more easily stay around when the parents
work than in urban areas and that there are some economies of scale in raising children
10Naturally, at time t, the human capital stock can diﬀer, in general, between parents in cities and
parents in the countryside. Similarly, human capital stock between parents in the same location can
diﬀer, depending on how long time ago their ancestors located there.
7in extended families. These assumptions imply that ert+1 < e
u
t+1: less time is devoted to
improving the quality of children in rural areas than in urban areas. Indeed, the threshold
value of returns to education above which education is provided is larger in rural than in
urban areas. In conclusion, a larger number of children are born for each generation in
rural areas, and they receive less education than in urban areas.
Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) gives evidence on the rural-urban fertility diﬀerence
for the USA. Finland provides another example of diﬀerentiated fertility rates. Finnish
industrialization is usually said to have started during 1860’s. During years 1936-1975
rural net and gross reproduction rates exceeded the urban rates (The Economic History
of Finland 3 1983, Historical Statistics, Table 1.15). For earlier periods (1860-1920) there
are no statistics on reproduction rates but the number of children born alive per family
was larger in countryside than in cities (The Economic History of Finland 2, 1982, Table
20). At the same time the share of urban population began to grow rapidly: in 1860 6
per cent of population lived in cities, in 1920 16 per cent.
Our model implies that rural urban migration, ceteris paribus, shows up as a reduction
in the birth rate. In this model then, demographic transition in the sense of declining
birth rates, is equivalent to observing rural-urban migration. For future reference, one
can calculate from (5), (8), and (11)
nrt+1 =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
(αγ + 1− γ) (τ r0 − τ 1)
≡ nr (12)
nut+1 =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
(τu0 − τ 1)
≡ nu
If no education is given then
nr =
(1− γ)
(αγ + 1− γ) τ r0
(13)
nu =
(1− γ)
τu0
For future reference one must also note that (using (11) in (5) and (8)):
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(14)
nu (1 + eu)θ = (1− γ)
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(14) implies that nr (1 + er)θ > nu (1 + eu)θ as as τu0 > τ
r
0. Each child born in cities receive
higher education, but the aggregate human capital created by an urban parent is smaller
than the one created by a rural parent, as the rural parent has more children. The eﬀect
from fertility dominates as the total time allocated to both raising and educating children
in countryside exceeds the urban time used for the same purposes. The result has an
implication for the aggregate growth rate of the economy as argued below.
(14) also implies that nj (1 + ej)θ reaches its minimum (as a function of θ) at τ
j
0−τ1
τ
j
0
where nr (1 + er)θ = (1−γ)
(αγ+1−γ)τr0
and nu (1 + eu)θ = (1−γ)
τu0
, i.e. at levels without education.
8The intuition is that if returns to education increase, then initially fertility rate declines
faster than the human capital from education. Only when the returns to education are
high enough, a further increase in θ increases the total human capital created in families.
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is a convex function, the maximum human capital is created if
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One implication of (15) and (16) is that human capital formation and thus also economic
growth can increase substantially after just a marginal increase in the returns to education,
and even if only a very small amount of education is provided. (15) also tells that the
human capital and economic growth rate may be at the highest level at small amounts
of education. Yet, the model is perfectly consistent with the empirical growth research
which has not found at the macro level any systematic relationship between the quantity
of education and growth, while at the same time there is strong evidence of beneficial
impact of education on earnings (and thus on productivity) at the micro-level (Bosworth
and Collins 2003)11. Since equations (14) are convex in θ, they imply a convex relationship
between education and human capital formation at the macro level. With convexity, a
cross-country aggregate growth regression would thus most likely not find education to
be a statistically significant explanatory variable, unless it is properly taken into account.
In fact, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) suggest that the convexity might be the source
of insignicance. But even if one cannot find any significant statistically relation at the
macro level at the micro level each person’s income increases with education, and this is
what the model here also implies.
To specify the equilibrium in the aggregate economy the production of the modern,
urban sector is given by
Qut = η eHt, η > 0
11Krueger and Lindahl (2001) obtain statistically significant eﬀects of education on growth after correcting
for measurement eﬀorts. Bosworth and Collins (2003) use the same corrections but do not get statistically
significant eﬀects after controlling for other variables aﬀecting growth.
9where eHt = aggregate human capital stock of workers working in the urban sector in period
t. This specification implies (assuming all markets to be competitive) that an uneducated
urban worker (having human capital equal to 1 if her parents also are uneducated) gets
wage η, and a worker with human capital ht receives wage ηht.
Since human capital is used only in the urban sector, and the human capital grows as
long as the urban good is produced, there will be rural-urban migration, at least over
some generations. Below it is shown that rural-urban migration goes on forever. Mokyr
(2002) has noted that historically rural-urban migration coincided with the switch of em-
ployment between traditional production and modern factory work, as the latter required
that people be collected to the same place. This was necessary both for technological
reasons and for the reason that cost of moving people declined relative to the cost of
utilizing the knowledge on which modern production is based. The productivity of the
urban production relative to rural production grows continuously improving urban relative
income.12
At the beginning of period t the generation then entering the labor market chooses in
which sector to work. In equilibrium the income in both sectors (net of costs due to fertility
and educational decisions) must be the same. To formulate the migration decision I use
the fundamental assumption in the traditional development model of Lewis (1954) and
its extension by Fei and Ranis (1964): within a rural household, income is divided equally
between family members. Hence, everybody’s income is given by the average productivity
of labor. Given the concave production function, this implies that rural employment is
"excessive" or that there is disguised unemployment as the marginal productivity is lower
than the average productivity. It is also a simple way to catch the notion of "tragedy of
commons" associated with resource abundance and currently emphasized as a source of
ineﬃciency leading to the resource curse.
Assume accordingly that the income is divided equally within the rural household.
The natural equilibrium condition for migration would be the requirement that for each
potential migrant the utility from staying in the countryside equals the utility to be
received in cities. The problem is that rural individual utility is not defined in the model,
as (1) gives the utility of the rural extended family, not the utility of an individual living in
countryside. To equate individual utility with the average utility in the family would also
be absurd. Instead, I assume that in equilibrium rural and urban incomes for potential
migrants must be equal. This condition also underlies the rural utility function (1). Hence,
the equilibrium condition for rural-urban migration becomes13, using (5) and (8):
prt
henrt αγαγ+(1−γ)iαR1−αenrt = γηhrt (17)
12There is much evidence that productivity in agriculture is lower than in manufacturing (see e.g. Thirl-
wall 1994, pp. 54-56). One could relatively easily add human capital as an input to the agricultural
production and assume its impact on productivity to be small relative to the urban sector. Alternatively,
one could assume that there is some spillover from the urban sector to agricultural productivity. For
analytical purposes these are left out, as the main point is in relative productivity.
13This formulation assumes that the ancestors of the people in countryside have always lived there, i.e.
there has not been any urban-rural migration.
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which can be solved for the number of people working in a rural household:
enrt = µγηhrtprtΓα
¶− 1
1−α
R (18)
where Γ ≡ αγ
αγ+(1−γ) and h
r
t = (1 + e
r)θt. There will be less rural-urban migration the
higher the price of agricultural goods, the smaller the human capital of people born in
the countryside, and the higher the resource endowment of the rural extended family.
Assume that there are N r rural extended families and that the total number of people
born in rural areas in period t − 1 is nrbt . Then in period t the total working rural and
urban populations are
N rt = N
renrt (19)
Nut = N
r
¡
nrbt − enrt¢+N rnubt
where nubt = urban population born in period t − 1. In (19) one must remember that
people born in cities also originally come from the same extended families as those born
in countryside. To get solution for pt, one must still solve for the equilibrium prices. Using
(18) and (5) the aggregate supply of the agricultural good is
N r
µ
prtΓ
γηhrt
¶ α
1−α
R (20)
In equilibrium, all the working citizens earn the same base wage (because of migration),
augmented by their human capital. From (17) we have that total income earned in a farm
is γηhrtenrt . Aggregate expenditure on rye is then given by14
βη
£
γN rHut + γN
renrthrt + γN r ¡nrbt − enrt¢hrt¤ = (21)
βηγ [N r (Hut +H
r
t )]
where Hut = aggregate human capital of the people born in the urban area for each of
N r original families in period t− 1, Hrt = aggregate human capital in each family of the
people born in the rural area in t− 1 = nrbt hrt . Equating nominal expenditure to nominal
supply, using (18) and (20), gives the equilibrium condition for the rye market and solving
it gives the price equation:
prt =
(βηγHt)
1−α (ηγhrt )
α
ΓαR(1−α)
(22)
where Ht ≡ Hut +Hrt = aggregate human capital. This can be substituted in (18) to get
the full reduced form presentation of rural-urban migration in period t. The solution is
enrt = βHthrt (23)
These results can be collected in the first proposition:
14Note that each person’s income takes into account the supply of labor net of time spent on raising and
educating children.
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Proposition 1 In autarky for given levels of aggregate human capital and rural human
capital, the relative price of the resource intensive good will be lower in a more resource
abundant country but rural population is independent of the resource availability.
The intuition here for the independence of the rural population from resource endow-
ment is the following: while larger resource stock increases the productivity of rural labor
it also implies that the price of the rural good is lower, which reduces incentives to mi-
grate. With the assumed functional forms these eﬀects cancel each other. This is clearly
a knife-edge case but these two eﬀects are present in more general models, whereby the
net result is ambiguous. With a general homothetic utility function it is easy to show
that larger resource endowment reduces (increases) rural-urban migration as the price
elasticity of demand for rye is smaller (larger) than unity.
Note that (23) does not imply that there is no rural-urban migration as human capital
grows. The rural birth rate is higher than the urban birth rate. If it is high enough, there
is rural-urban migration even though simultaneously also the rural population grows. To
see this, imagine period 0 at which modern production starts and there is migration
to factories in the cities. Let the population at the beginning of period be n0. Rural
population in period 0 is β by (23) as human capital is equal to unity. Assume that
n0 > β. Aggregate human capital at the beginning of period 1 is H1 = βnr (1 + er)
θ +
(n0 − β)nu (1 + eu)θ, and hr1 = (1 + er)
θ. Since H0 = n0 and hr0 = 1 there will be rural-
urban migration in period 1 if at the beginning of period 1 there are more people in the
rural area than eventually want to stay there. This holds as long as H1
hr1
/H0
hr0
< nr, which
is equivalent to nr (1 + er)θ > nu (1 + eu)θ, which holds by (14).
In general, one can derive the dynamics for this economy as follows15: By definition the
following holds for Hut
Hut = H
u
t−1n
u (1 + eu)θ +
¡
nrbt−1 − enrt−1¢ (1 + er)θ(t−1) nu (1 + eu)θ (24)
Also by definition nrbt−1 = enrt−2nr. Using (23) twice (24) and can be written as
Hut = n
u (1 + eu)θ
h
Hut−1 − βHt−1 + βnr (1 + er)
θ
Ht−2
i
(25)
At the same time, aggregate human capital is by definition
Ht = enrt−1nr (1 + er)θt +Hut (26)
which yields finally
Ht = β
Ht−1
hrt−1
nr (1 + er)θt +Hut = (27)
βnr (1 + er)θHt−1 +H
u
t
15I derive the dynamics for the case where ej > 0, j = r,u. Formally the dynamic system is the same
for the other cases but in some situations there would be urban-rural -migration. For the case where ej
= 0 for both j = r,u, the results hold. In case where no education is given in the countryside but there
is urban education there may be urban-rural migration. But even then this is not necessary, as will be
shown in the next section.
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The diﬀerence equation system (25) and (27) can be solved. The system governs the
economy, as long as enrt < enrt−1nr, i.e. as long as there is rural-urban migration. The
condition can be rewritten as Ht
Ht−1
< nr (1 + er)θ. Using the lag operator L (25) can be
rewritten as
(1− yL)Hut = (−βy + βxyL)Ht−1
where x ≡ nr (1 + er)θ and y ≡ nu (1 + eu)θ.16 Using this in (27) gives
Ht = βxHt−1 +
−βy + βxyL
1− yL Ht−1 ⇔ (28)
(1− yL)Ht = (1− yL)βxHt−1 + (−βy + βxyL)Ht−1 ⇔
Ht = [βx+ (1− β) y]Ht−1
(28) implies the following result:
Proposition 2 Assume that ej > 0, j = r, u. Then there is always rural-urban migration,
i.e. the migration flows never reverse.
Proof : (28) gives Ht
Ht−1
= βx + (1− β) y. There is rural urban migration (as shown
above) if and only if βx+(1− β) y < x. This is equivalent to having y < x, i.e. nu (1 + eu)θ
< nr (1 + er)θ, which was shown to hold above.¥
Using similar reasoning one can also find the reduced form diﬀerence equation governing
urban based human capital Hut . It is
Hut = [βx+ (1− β) y]Hut−1 (29)
Aggregate and urban based human capital grow at the same rate. It equals also the
growth rate of the modern sector production as
Qut = η
£
Hut +
¡
nrbt − enrt¢hrt¤ = (30)
η
"
Hut + β
Ã
nr (1 + er)θ
βnr (1 + er)θ + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ
− 1
!
Ht
#
A remarkable feature in (28), (29), and (30) is that the growth rate depends on both
fertility and educational decisions. Furthermore, it is a weighted average of the decisions
made in countryside and cities. The weight is given by the share of traditional goods on
total consumer expenditure. In the aggregate, in any given period, the addition to human
capital is larger in the countryside than in the urban areas. In the countryside, children
are less educated than in cities, but there are more children per resident than in cities.
The latter eﬀect dominates making nu (1 + eu)θ < nr (1 + er)θ. Since rural population
is basically determined by the demand for the resource intensive good, the growth rate
of the modern sector is higher, the larger is the share of final demand allocated to the
non-modern sector good. This type of an eﬀect is absent from more standard endogenous
16I am assuming that y 6= 1.
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growth models, and here it is derived from diﬀerential fertility and educational choices
across sectors in the economy17. Also, the Verdoorn’s law (Thirlwall 1994, pp. 60-61)
holds here, as aggregate economic growth is equivalent to growth in the modern sector.
But as was just argued, the demand for the goods produced in the traditional sector is a
crucial determinant of the growth rate because of the demographic factors.
Note that the model implies that the rural output will grow at a lower rate than the
urban output, as one should see for it to be consistent with stylized facts. Rural output
grows at a rate (using (23))
³
βx+(1−β)y
(1+er)θ
´α
which clearly is smaller than the urban growth
rate βx+ (1− β) y.
Another interesting aspect of the growth process here is that there will be an ever-
widening urban-rural average income gap. This is because the rural personal human
capital grows at a slower rate than the human capital of people living in cities. In addition,
relative incomes of people in cities stay constant, but personal income dispersion will grow:
there will be new migrants whose incomes become every period lower than incomes of the
people who have resided in cities over many periods. Incomes of those people, who are
descendants of people who moved to cities in period 0, grow all the time relative to new
migrants’ incomes. These people form the "urban elite".
Finally, one can note that the model is reminiscent of the unbalanced growth model of
Baumol (1967). Baumol’s concern there was that in an economy with two sectors if the
productivity in one of the sectors grows faster than in the other then in the long run the
slow productivity growth sector will end up taking all the resources. Here the economy
also has two sectors in one of which productivity growth is faster. Yet, the more productive
sector will expand also by drawing resources from the sector with low productivity. The
diﬀerence to Baumol’s model comes from demographics (rural population growth exceeds
the urban population growth) and from human capital formation which provides incentives
for the people to move to cities.
Equations (22) and (23) raise an interesting possibility, which is crucial for the main
argument of the paper, that without international trade, resource abundant countries can
have a higher growth rate in the modern sector than resource poor economies. They also
imply that depending on the timing of the modernization, in the sense of birth of the
modern sector, that the price of the resource intensive good can be higher in resource
rich economies than in resource poor economies. This happens if resource abundant
economies have a higher stock of human capital since then the demand for rye is higher
implying higher price. In this case the initially resource intensive economies have been
transformed to human capital intensive economies. On the other hand, if trade between
resource rich and poor economies is opened early, the resource rich economy specializes
in rye production and the resource poor in the industrial production. If we compare
countries resource rich and poor countries that modernized at the same time with equal
initial population, the growth of human capital and modern production is the same in
both countries. The only diﬀerence between the countries then is that the more resource
abundant country has lower price of rye. These remarks are collected in
Proposition 3 Without international trade, resource abundance does not have any im-
17E.g. in Murata (2002) the eﬀect goes in the other direction. In his model the link between agriculture
and the modern sector works through the inputs produced by the modern sector and used by agriculture.
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pact on the growth of human capital nor on the modern production.
This result holds despite the fact that the model builds on the assumption that the rural
employment is excessively large. The crucial point is that it holds for the closed economy.
The next section studies how resource abundance and international trade interact.
3. International trade and resource curse
Assume now that there exist two countries in the world, H and F (indicated by the
superscript). Assume that until period t (at the beginning of which trade is opened before
people have made their migration decisions) they have developed as autarkic economies.
Assuming identical preferences and technologies in both countries, (22) implies that in
autarky equilibrium prHt < p
rF
t if
HHt
RH
<
HFt
RF
, hrHt < h
rF
t (31)
(31) holds, e.g. if both countries have started to develop approximately at the same time
and H has a larger resource stock, RH > RF . Also if country F had at the onset of
industrialization larger rural families, (23) implies that it had larger early rural-urban
migration. It thus has, given ert+1 < e
u
t+1, a larger stock of human capital than H at any
point of time. Finally, if F began to industrialize earlier than H, but had a larger resource
endowment, it is possible that it is relatively resource poor at time t. From now on assume
that (31) holds. This implies that when trade between the countries is opened country H
will export rye in the trading equilibrium.
Using (20) and (21) and the appropriate condition for migration, the net excess demand
for rye in any of the countries is (I have dropped the country superscript) as a function
of the price of rye
βηγ
prt
[N r (Hut +H
r
t )]−N r
µ
prtΓ
γηhrt
¶ α
1−α
R, (32)
prt ≤
γηhut
¡
nubt + n
rb
t
¢1−α
ΓαR1−α
− (1− β)N rγ
¡
nubt + n
rb
t
¢α
R1−α, prt >
γηh
u,high
t
¡
nubt + n
rb
t
¢1−α
ΓαR1−α
which clearly is non-increasing in the price of rye. Note that nubt + n
rb
t equals the size of
a rural family, if urban residents move back to countryside. Complete specialization in
modern sector production is here never an equilibrium, as with (17) the average product of
labor in rural production goes to infinity when labor supply to rural production approaches
0. (32) implies that world excess demand for rye is also non-increasing in rye price. Notice
that in the condition for full specialization in production of rye (the RHS of the last
inequality in (32) ), hu,hight denotes the largest human capital of the person who was urban
resident in period t-1.18 It is the human capital of a child born to a person whose ancestors
migrated from countryside at the beginning of period 0. In (32), it is also assumed that if a
18This is the person whose ancestors moved to the modern sector when industrial revolution began.
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country is completely specialized, the current generation expects complete specialization
also in the next period (see below).19 Since in autarky the equilibrium exists in both
countries, we get
Proposition 4 The international trade equilibrium price exists, is unique and lies be-
tween the autarky equilibrium prices.
Consider first the situation when country H is completely specialized in production
of rye (and F thus produces both of the goods). All urban people in H thus move at
the beginning of period t back to rural area to the farms where their forefathers lived.
Assuming that all these people also expect their children still to live in the countryside,
they do not want to give any education to their children, and make their fertility decisions
(in analogy to (1)) by choosing nt+1 to maximize(
prt [nt (1− τ r0nt+1)]
α
R1−α
(prt )
β
)γ (
prt+1n
α
t+1R
1−α¡
prt+1
¢β
)1−γ
giving
nt+1 =
1− γ
τ r0
≡ nrS (33)
which gives the birth rate in an economy without modern sector. (33) implies that the
model can be consistent with the stylized facts associated with demographic transition
(e.g. Lee 2003, Lucas 2002, Ray 1998). At the onset of industrialization and take-oﬀ to
the sustained growth birth rate first increases and then begins to decline. Since in the
presence of a modern sector the rural birth rate (from (5) and (11)) is (1−γ)(1−θ)
(τr0−τ1)(αγ+1−γ)
,
if (
τr0−τ1)
τr0
< 1−θ
αγ+1−γ , the birth rate increases when industrialization begins and starts to
decline with rural-urban migration20 (see also the concluding section).
The world equilibrium is determined by the following equation (using (32)) (I am as-
suming, for simplicity that N rH = N rF ):
πt (1− β)
¡
γnHt
¢α ¡
RH
¢1−α
= (34)
βηγHFt −N rπt
µ
πtΓ
γηhrFt
¶ α
1−α
RF
19Were they to expect incomplete specialization next period one would have to substitute αγαγ+1−γ for γ
in the last line of (32).
20This interpretation neglects the fact that in most countries reduction in mortality preceeded changes
in fertility explaining much of the demographic transition. France and USA were exceptions (Lee 2003).
My model shares this defect with most other models of demographic transition. Kalemli-Ozcan (2003)
models the impacts of exogenous changes in the mortality rate on fertility decisions. Lehmijoki (2003, ch.
3) contains a model with endogenous mortality and fertility. Yet, even though I am focusing on fertility
only, demographic transition is here tied to internal mobility and the share of population engaged in
primary production which is a diﬀerent angle and independent of the fertility-mortality discussion.
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where πt ≡ world market equilibrium price of rye. The condition for complete specializa-
tion in H (last inequality in (32)) is clearly satisfied, if RF is small enough, and HFt and
RH are large enough.
Since the equilibrium world market price in the period when trade is opened lies between
the autarky prices, incomes in both countries necessarily increase But with complete
specialization the modernization comes to at least a temporary end in H while it gets
a boost in F since trade induces larger rural-urban migration. We can state this as a
proposition
Proposition 5 Opening of international trade can reverse modernization in an economy
with low human capital relative to the resource stock.
In H, trade induces urban-rural migration that can increase the aggregate birth rate.
This happens if the increase in the birth rate due to urban-rural migration outweighs the
decline in the rural residents’ birth rate as a consequence of the reduction in investment
to education. If 1−γ
τr0
>
(1−γ)(1−θ)
τu0−τ1
or τ
u
0−τ1
τr0
> (1− θ) then the people moving from urban
to rural area increase their fertility. At the same time, the rural residents increase the
share of time they devote to work. If one interpretation of the resource curse is that
resource abundance prevents the economy from developing the modern sector, then clearly
international trade can create the curse, while without trade there is none. In cross-
country regressions, resource abundant countries would show slower productivity growth,
in case they are open to international trade. This is the mechanism analogous to the one
explored in Matsuyama (1992).
The previous proposition does not, of course, indicate that the resource abundant coun-
try suﬀers a welfare loss due to trade opening. It is of interest, however, to see how the
equilibrium evolves over time. Thus, consider next what the world market price of rye is
in period t + 1. It is straightforward to calculate that the equilibrium condition is (as-
suming still that people in H expect that period t+ 2 equilibrium also involves complete
specialization)
πt+1S
H
t
¡
nrS
¢α
= βηγ
¡
HFt
¢ h
βnr (1 + er)θ + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ
i
− (35)
− (πt+1)
1
1−α
Ã
Γ
ηγhrFt (1 + e
r)θ
! α
1−α
RF
where SHt = supply of rye from H in period t. We get immediately the following result:
Proposition 6 If nrS ≤ 1 but βnr (1 + er)θ + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ > 1 then πt+1 > πt:
the terms of trade of the relatively resource abundant country that is completely specialized
in resource intensive good improve if its population growth rate is small enough.
The proposition tells that even when modernization has stopped in the country, it can
benefit from modernization in other countries through improvements in its terms of trade.
A suﬃcient precondition for welfare gains is that fertility in the resource abundant country
cannot be too high, while returns to education in the other country must be high enough.
This is the mechanism through which, in a Ricardian model, technological progress in one
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country benefits other countries. Under the conditions of the proposition, the resource
abundant country will always remain completely specialized in the production of rye and
the modern sector would never be introduced into it, not at least by market forces alone.
It is possible that the terms of trade for the resource abundant country decline. The
intuition is simple: Opening up to trade implies that the demographic process in the
resource abundant country changes completely. The birth rate relative to the urban
growth rate grows, and depending on the returns to education, may even get higher than
the rural birth rate. Without rural-urban migration the whole growing population is
employed in the production of the resource intensive good. Its supply increases by the
factor
¡
nrS
¢α
(the LHS of (35)). At the same time (in the RHS of (35)) demand in F
increases by the factor
h
βnr (1 + er)θ + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ
i
and supply falls by the factorh
(1 + er)θ
i α
1−α
. To find a case where terms of trade deteriorate, consider the situation
where τ r0 < 2τ 1 < τ
u
0 and θ =
τu0−τ1
τ
j
0
, i.e. there is no rural education (rural human capital
growth is purely extensive, traditional knowledge stock is augmented by increasing the
number of children), and returns to education are such that urban human capital growth
is at minimal level (see the discussion above before (15))21. This makes, first of all, the
supply of rye at F independent of time. Then we know that nu (1 + eu)θ < nrS < nr.
Assume also that nrS > 1 and
¡
nrS
¢α
> nu (1 + eu)θ (which holds if α and/or τuo are large
enough). Then
¡
nrS
¢α
> βnr + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ if β is suﬃciently small. The larger
α is, the closer nrS and nr are (see (13)) (and with larger α β can also be larger and the
inequality is still satisfied). Assume finally that RF is very small to make πtSHt close to
βηγ
¡
HFt
¢
(and to justify the assumption that equilibrium entails complete specialization
in rye at H). We get then
Proposition 7 The terms of trade of the country specializing in production of the re-
source intensive good begin to decline, if i) the country has high enough fertility with ii)¡
nrS
¢α
>
(1−γ)
τu0
, iii) there is no rural education, iv) the share of resource intensive good in
expenditure,β, is low enough, and v) the natural resource stock of the country exporting
the modern sector good is small .
Note that nothing here requires that βnr + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ < 1, i.e. demand can
grow and terms of trade can still deteriorate. The low share of expenditure on rye is
needed to make the increase in net demand in F, due to population growth and human
capital accumulation, limited. This is reminiscent of the Prebisch-Singer -argument for
terms of trade deterioration but here the point is not the low income elasticity but the
demographics of the country specializing in the production of the modern good.
The terms of trade decline in the previous proposition cannot last for ever, even though
it can last for several generations. The condition for the full specialization is πt+k >
γηh
u,high
t
?
nHt (nrS)
k?1−α
ΓαR1−α , k ≥ 1. If the terms of trade continuously deteriorate and population
grows (implying that income per capita from rural production declines), the inequality
21Note that this case does not violate the constraint that there is rural urban migration even though er
= 0 and eu > 0, as with the assumptions made nr > nu (1 + eu)θ.
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turns eventually into an equality22. At that point modern production is reintroduced
in country H23. In a way, we get the paradoxical result: A resource intensive country
benefiting from trade may never modernize, but country suﬀering temporarily from trade
will return back to production in the modern sector. However, its productivity will lag
permanently behind the most advanced countries.
Given that demographics are crucial for the terms of trade to deteriorate the resource
abundant country has obvious incentives to regulate fertility. If the population growth
can be limited to n ≤ 1 < nrS then by Proposition 5 the resource abundant country can
avoid the decline in its terms of trade as long as fertility decisions are such that aggregate
human capital stock increases in the other country.
Consider finally the case where 2τ 1 < τ r0, and children receive education everywhere.
Assume though that θ = τ
r
0−τ1
τr0
giving nr (1 + er)θ = (1−γ)
(αγ+1−γ)τr0
. Define ρ > 0 so that
τ r0 ≡ 2 (1 + ρ) τ 1 This gives (1 + er)
θ =
·
1 +
τr0(τr0−2τ1)
τ1
¸ τr0−τ1
τ1
= [1 + 4ρ (1 + ρ) τ 1]
2(1+ρ)−1.
Thus, the smaller τ 1 and τ r0 get the closer to unity (1 + e
r)θ will be. As was shown
above, nu (1 + eu)θ < nr (1 + er)θ for all θ for which both rural and urban children are
educated. Fix now α and β such that
¡
nrS
¢α
> nu (1 + eu)θ and
¡
nrS
¢α
> βnr (1 + er)θ +
(1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ just like above. Assume finally τ 1 and τ r0 to be so small that
¡
nrS
¢α
>
[1 + 4ρ (1 + ρ) τ 1]
2(1+ρ)−1 and that the resource stock in F is small. From (35) we see that
with these assumptions, the terms of trade of the resource abundant country deteriorate
even when education is provided to all children in the foreign country. Hence
Proposition 8 The terms of trade of the country specializing completely in the production
of the resource intensive good can deteriorate after international trade is opened, even
when in the rest of the world education is provided to all children.
It is interesting that the real GDP per capita in the completely specialized resource
abundant country declines if population grows as the growth rate is given by
¡
nrS
¢α−1
:
the diminishing returns in agriculture reduces income. The real incomes can increase if
and only if terms of trade improve. At the same time the real GDP per capita in the
other country exporting the manufacturing good increases as nu < nu (1 + eu)θ, and nr
≤ nr (1 + er)θ. Yet, the previous propositions on terms of trade deterioration hold only
for the case where the resource rich country has a higher aggregate GDP growth rate
than the resource rich country as
¡
nrS
¢α
>
¡
nrS
¢α
> βnr (1 + er)θ + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ.
With the same reasoning as in the previous two propositions the terms of trade problem
disappears if returns to education increase.
22Note that I am here assuming that the human capital inherited from parents does not disappear even
if parents do not provide any education. One can drop the assumption and assume that it evaporates
without education. In this case, one just substitutes 1 for hu,hight .
23With rational expectations, the generation that understands the reappearance of the modern sector,
change their fertility and educational decisions. Given the assumption underlying the previous proposition
that er is close to 0, if nr > nrS (assumption consistent with the stylized facts of demographic transition),
there may be a deep decline in terms of trade of the resource abundant country before the emergence of
the modern sector.
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Consider next the case, where both countries are incompletely specialized. Using (32),
one can calculate the equilibrium price to be
π
1
1−α
t = (36)
βηγHWt³
Γ
ηγ
´ α
1−α
·
RH
(hrHt )
α
1−α
+ R
F
(hrFt )
α
1−α
¸
where HWt ≡ HFt +HHt . Updating this for the next period gives24
Proposition 9 If both countries are incompletely specialized then the terms of trade of the
country exporting the resource intensive good improve if aggregate human capital grows,
i.e. βnr (1 + er)θ + (1− β)nu (1 + eu)θ ≥ 1.
While the proposition clearly implies that an incompletely specialized resource abun-
dant country cannot loose from trade as long as world’s human capital stock grows, it is
clear that there will be less migration in it, which has an adverse impact on the growth
of the modern sector. If trade is opened at the dawn of industrialization it is clear that
it can induce higher birth rate, as in Galor and Mountford (2003).
Propositions 7, 8 and 9 can be interpreted to imply that the structure of free world
trade may be biased against countries relying solely on resource based goods in their
exports. In the framework of the model, a country can gain certainly from trade if it has
accumulated enough human capital before it enters the world trading system, as then its
production structure is diversified. High enough human capital stock allows it to diversify
its production base, and detach itself from the demographic trap: The crucial mechanism
creating the biased structure of world trade is the demographics in the resource abundant
country. With a diversified production structure, the resource abundant country can
benefit from the expansion of human capital in both countries. Perhaps the model is
stretched too far, but in broad terms the experience in both China, India and South-
Korea seems to be in accordance with the basic message. China and India have started to
enter the world trading system, after staying out of it for quite a long period. Both of them
have invested in education and birth control. In general, the successful Asian economies
like South-Korea invested a lot to basic education, while opening their economies slowly
to trade. The point is that the pattern of international specialization depends on the
history of the economy.
4. Technology diﬀusion, trade and land markets
Until now the analysis has been based on the assumption that there is no technology
diﬀusion. It has been assumed away both domestically and in the international economy.
Domestically the assumption has been that human capital is accumulated only within
families and there is no diﬀusion between families. While the assumption that families
are important for human capital accumulation is realistic (e.g. Oreopoulos, Page and
24Naturally here as also above, if the terms of trade of the resource abundant country improve then the
terms of trade of the resource poor country deteriorate.
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Stevens 2003), one should allow for spill-overs. Nothing would basically change if one
allowed spill-overs in the urban environment, e.g. in the form that the children of the
migrants to cities are able to absorb the human capital of those whose families have
stayed there for a long time. The same holds as well, if one allows for urban-rural spill-
overs. Then people facing the migration decision would have higher human capital stock.
Consequently, in equation (17), determining the rural-urban migration, the right hand side
would be larger to reflect the enhanced earnings in cities. Domestic technology diﬀusion
would then make it less probable that the resource abundant country would in a trading
equilibrium specialize completely in producing the resource intensive good.
International trade has been shown to be an important channel for technology diﬀusion
(Keller 2002). The model can be augmented easily to take this into account. With
international diﬀusion, the human capital of the country with lower initial capital stock
is being increased. Even if the diﬀusion takes place between cities only, it makes it less
likely that the resource abundant country completely specializes in the production of
the resource intensive good (see (32)). If the diﬀusion spreads also to the countryside,
the conclusion is even stronger. Yet, even though trade is important for diﬀusion, its
importance has grown substantially only lately (Keller 2002).
One must note that the analysis in the previous sections is based on the assumption
that there is no market for land. With land market and individual land-ownership and
commercial farming migration decisions would be based on marginal returns from staying
in the rural area and from migration. Consequently, at the time land markets are estab-
lished, one would observe larger rural-urban migration as the model now implies, since
marginal returns to farming are below the average returns. Also land-ownership could
be separated from the site where one is working. But still, assuming that the basic cost
of raising children is lower in a rural than urban environment, the same idea of human
capital enhancing migration and decline in the birth rate due to migration would still
hold.
5. Concluding comments
The paper has built a two-sector model of international trade, development and de-
mographic transition based on classical models of Lewis, Fei and Ranis, and Harris and
Todaro. The basic idea is that in a dual economy demographic decisions depend on where
people reside. Here people working in the sector using natural resources have higher birth
rate and give less education to their children than people working in the modern sector
using human capital as the sole input. These results are consistent with the stylized facts
of demographic transition. Rural-urban migration is associated with a switch of employ-
ment from the resource intensive sector to the modern sector. Consequently, migration
induces higher growth of human capital. The main question asked is whether an economy
endowed with a larger resource stock will have lower rate of modernization and growth
of human capital than a resource poor economy, and under what conditions the possible
resource curse can be observed. There are two main results. First, an autarkic economy
will never face the resource curse. Secondly, a resource abundant country opening to
international trade may face resource curse if it completely specializes in the production
of the resource intensive good. The country’s terms of trade can decline over an extended
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period if its population growth rate is high, and the returns to education in the other
country are large enough. This lends some support for the Prebisch-Singer -hypothesis,
though the mechanism used here diﬀers from theirs. The terms of trade decline analyzed
here is created completely by demographic change induced by the opening of trade. The
result also shows the potential importance of birth control in development.
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis relied on the assumptions that demand for primary
goods is income inelastic. In a growing economy the relative demand for the goods
facing inelastic demand declines, which, ceteris paribus, implies that the relative prices of
these goods fall. But in a general equilibrium one must also understand, what happens
the supply of goods: why are resources not shifted to sectors, whose prices increase?
Inelasticity of demand for primary goods is used by Matsuyama (1992) to generate labor
flow to the modern production. The point in this paper is that one can abandon the
assumption of income inelasticity and still get rural-urban migration and falling relative
price of primary goods, when trade is opened, by focusing on demographic issues. Were
one to assume income inelastic demand for primary goods (and drop the assumption of
Cobb-Douglas preferences over commodities) here all the results would only strengthen
as one can easily see. This holds especially for the terms-of-trade changes.
One by-product of the present paper is that it has produced a model of continuous
rural-urban migration and a theory of urbanization as a source of economic growth. An
additional result is that there exists an ever-increasing urban-rural wage gap. Another
by-product is that the paper provides an explanation to the puzzle, why in growth studies
the impact of education appears to be insignificant, while in studies based on microdata
education is a significant determinant of incomes. The model implies that at the ag-
gregate level the relationship between growth and education is convex while at the level
of individuals there is a linear relationship between their human capital (determined by
education) and incomes. The convexity is created by the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ in
fertility decisions: fertility declines if more education is provided.
All the results have been derived without assuming any externalities. One can incor-
porate fairly easily externalities in human capital formation of the type analyzed in de la
Croix and Doepke (2003), Lucas (2004) and Matsuyama (1992) and in many of the other
studies cited above. It is obvious that the main results would not change. In fact, they
would only strengthen.
The model can also easily be extended to contain a theory of industrialization, and
escape from the Malthusian trap assuming that the existence of modern technology is
known. The population would grow at the rate nrS if the modern good is not produced.
If nrS > 1, the average product of labor would decline, and at some point it would equal
η, the return one can earn from the modern technology, and modernization would begin.
As explained in section 3, the demographic pattern of the model would then be consistent
with the observed pattern of demographic transition.
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